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it began to dawn on Reagan that one alternative to the unpalatable Bush
might be former President Gerald Ford, assuming the latter could be
convinced to make the run. Two days before Reagan left for Detroit,
according to one of his strategists, Reagan "came to the conclusion that it
would be Bush, but he wasn't all that happy about it." / Note #1 / Note #6
But this was not yet the last word.
Casey, Meese and Michael Deaver sounded out Ford, who was reluctant but did
not issue a categorical rejection. Stuart Spencer, Ford's 1976 campaign
manager, reported to Reagan on his contacts with Ford. "Ron," Spencer said,
"Ford ain't gonna do it, and you're gonna pick Bush." But judging from
Reagan's reaction, Spencer recalled later, "There was no way he was going
to pick Bush," and the reason was simple: Reagan just didn't like the guy.
"It was chemistry," Spencer said. / Note #1 / Note #7
Reagan now had to be ground down by an assortment of Eastern Liberal
Establishment perception-mongers and political heavies. Much of the
well-known process of negotiation between Reagan and Ford for the "Dream
Ticket" of 1980 was simply a charade to disorient and demoralize Reagan
while eating up the clock, until the point was reached when Reagan would
have no choice but to make the classic phone call to Bush. It is obvious
that Reagan offered the vice-presidency to Ford, and that the latter
refused to accept it outright, but engaged in a process of negotiations
ostensibly in order to establish the conditions under which he might,
eventually, accept. / Note #1 / Note #8 Casey called in Henry Kissinger and
asked him to intercede with Ford. What then developed was a marathon of
haggling in which Ford was represented by Kissinger, Alan Greenspan, Jack
Marsh and Bob Barrett. Reagan was represented by Casey, Meese and
perception-monger Richard Wirthlin. Dick Cheney, Ford's former chief of
staff, who is now Bush's pro-genocide secretary of defense, also got into
the act.
This complex strategy of intrigue culminated in Ford's notorious interview
with Walter Cronkite, in which the CBS anchorman asked Ford if "It's got to
be something like a co-presidency?" "That's something Governor Reagan
really ought to consider," replied Ford, which was not what a serious
vice-presidential candidate might say, but did correspond rather well to
what "Gerry the Jerk" would say if he wanted to embarrass Reagan and help
Bush.
The best indication that Ford had been working all along as an agent of
Bush was provided by Ford himself to Germond and Witcover: "Ford,
incidentally, told us after the election that one of his prime objectives
at the convention had been 'to subtly help George Bush get the
[vice-presidential] nomination.'|" / Note #1 / Note #9
Drew Lewis helped Reagan make the call that he found so distasteful. Reagan
came on the line: "Hello, George, this is Ron Reagan. I'd like to go over
to the convention and announce that you're my choice for vice president ...
if that's all right with you."
"I'd be honored, Governor."
Reagan now proceeded to the convention floor, where he would announce his
choice of Bush. Knowing that this decision would alienate many of Reagan's
ideological backers, the Reagan campaign leaked the news that Bush had been
chosen to the media, so that it would quickly spread to the convention
floor. They were seeking to cushion the blow, to avoid mass expressions of
disgust when Bush's name was announced. Even as it was, there was much
groaning and booing among the Reagan faithful.
As the Detroit convention came to a close, the Reagan and Bush campaign
staffs were merged, with James Baker assuming a prominent position in the
Casey-run Reagan campaign. The Ray Cline, Halper, and Gambino operations
were all continued. From this point on, Reagan's entourage would be heavily
infiltrated by Bushmen.
The October Surprise
The Reagan-Bush campaign, now chock full of Bush's Brown Brothers
Harriman/Skull and Bones assets, announced a campaign of espionage. This
campaign told reporters that it was going to spy on the Carter regime.
Back in April, Carter had taken to live television at 7:00 a.m. one morning
to announce some ephemeral progress in his efforts to secure the release of
State Department officials and others from the U.S. embassy in Teheran, who
were being held as hostages by the Khomeini forces in Iran. This
announcement was timed to coincide with Democratic primaries in Kansas and
Wisconsin, in which Carter was able to overwhelm challenges from Teddy
Kennedy and Jerry Brown. A memo from Richard Wirthlin to Casey and Reagan
initiated a discussion of how the Carter gang might exploit the advantages
of incumbency in order to influence the outcome of the election, perhaps by
attempting to stampede the public by some dramatic event at the last
minute, such as the freeing of the hostages in Teheran. On April 24, a [ Pobierz całość w formacie PDF ]